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Since the mid 1980s both Government and private sector
buying organizations have used certified supplier programs to
improve the quality of their supplier base. Certified supplier
programs improve a company' s suppliers by requiring and
recognizing excellent quality practices and by eliminating poor
quality suppliers. This study examines current commercial and
Government certified supplier programs, including the Army
Contractor Performance Certification Program CP(2), in order to
find successful certification techniques and recommend
improvements to CP(2). Some of the better practices currently in
use are: requiring a high level of past quality performance for
certification, giving certified contractors more future business
as an incentive for participation, and using ISO 9001 as the
common standard for quality management processes. By adopting
these techniques, the Army can improve CP(2) and make it an even
more valuable program.
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the feasibility of
using past performance information to certify U.S. Army
contractors through the Army' s Contractor Performance
Certification Program [CP(2)] and to make recommendations for
improvements to the program.
B . BACKGROUND
Expanding the use of performance information to increase
efficiency in acquisition is one of the current thrusts of
acquisition reform. A proven way to use performance information
to the buyer's benefit is to establish a supplier certification
program. Commercial companies realize significant benefits from
supplier certification or preferred supplier programs. The Army
currently has the CP(2) program in place. Some of the benefits
of these programs are: increased quality of incoming materiel
and supplies, reduced oversight of contractors, reduced or
eliminated inspection requirements, and good
contractor-Government relations. Therefore, the Army can
benefit from a good program to certify contractors.
There are, however, significant barriers to CP(2)'s success,
such as CICA limitations, current Federal acquisition policies
and practices, and the cost of collecting and evaluating the
performance information. No new policy can be implemented unless
there is a reasonable expectation that its benefits will outweigh
its costs. This thesis will analyze successful programs and the






What are the significant problems associated with the Army's
Contractor Performance Certification Program, and what actions
can be taken to overcome these problems and improve the supplier
certification program for the U.S. Army?
2 . Subsidiary Research Questions
a. What limitations does CICA place on certification
of contractors and what can be done to overcome these
limitations?
b. What limitations do current Army policies and
culture place on certification of contractors and how can they be
overcome?
c. What lessons can be learned from supplier
certification programs in other Government organizations and how
can they be implemented in the Army?
d. What are the key elements of successful supplier
certification programs in commercial companies and how can they
be implemented in the Army?
e. What are the metrics that can be used to measure the
costs and benefits of a supplier certification program in the
Army in order to determine the cost effectiveness of the program?
D . SCOPE
This research addresses supplier certification as it
pertains to the Army. It includes a literature review of major
issues that affect implementation of a supplier certification
program in the Army. In addition, it examines several current
successful commercial and Government programs concentrating on
lessons learned and possible recommendations for the Army.
E . METHODOLOGY
This study used literature research and interviews with Army
procurement officials to determine what barriers to the CP(2)
program exist in the Army and Federal procurement systems. It
uses interviews with managers of Government and commercial
supplier certification programs and program documentation to
determine key elements of successful programs. From this data
possible solutions for the Army were identified and evaluated.
Finally, the best solutions were chosen and recommendations
synthesized for implementing a more successful contractor
certification program in the Army.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter I (Introduction) is an introduction including a
brief purpose, background, scope and methodology.
Chapter II (Literature Review) provides an overview of
supplier certification programs and the history of their use in
both the Government and commercial sectors. It includes a
detailed examination of the significant barriers and limitations
to certification programs in the Army.
Chapter III (Presentation of Data) is a presentation of the
data gathered from numerous interviews with procurement officials
both in the Government and industry. It provides insights and
lessons learned from both sides of the issue as well as an
overview of current practices and methods used in commercial and
Government programs. It also includes examination of the metrics
used to measure the costs and benefits of certification programs.
Chapter IV (Analysis) is an analysis of the data from
chapters II and III to determine which methods and practices, if
any, should be used to improve the Army's CP(2) program.
Chapter V (Conclusions and Recommendations) presents the
findings of the study and provides recommendations for
implementation of specific practices for a supplier certification
program. In addition, it provides answers to the research
questions as well as recommendations for further study.
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
The main benefits of this study are the recommendations to
the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) for regarding improvements
to the current CP(2) program. Army contracting personnel who
implement the program will benefit from the lessons learned in
other programs and the proposals for surmounting institutional
and regulatory barriers. The Army will benefit from improvements
to the program through a more efficient procurement process that
saves time and money and obtains high quality products.
Additionally, future students may benefit from recommendations
for further study which could lead to more complete study of






The literature pertinent to Government supplier
certification or pre-qualification programs is divided into three
general categories: articles on commercial applications,
Government laws and regulations, and Government studies. These
three general categories provide the necessary background
information for this study. Articles in the commercial field
describe historical development, evaluation methods, and current
trends in supplier certification programs. The Government
studies detail early attempts to certify Government suppliers and
some of the problems encountered. Government laws and
acquisition regulations set the limits within which procurement
officials must work when implementing a supplier certification
program.
The current trend toward the use of more efficient
commercial practices in Government procurement includes the
concept of "Best Value" source selection decisions. A key
element of best value is considering a supplier' s past
performance as part of the source selection criteria. Most
commercial companies take this a step further by certifying their
top quality suppliers based on quality performance and doing most
of their business with those suppliers. The commercial
literature section explains why these supplier certification
programs are considered essential to success in many companies.
The Government cannot implement identical programs for various
reasons outlined in the two sections on Government literature
below.
B. COMMERCIAL LITERATURE
Commercial literature on supplier certification programs
shows that most large companies have such programs, and that they
consider the benefits well worth the costs. Additionally,
current commercial articles point out some of the methods used by
companies with successful programs.
1 . The Current Trends
Beginning with the Total Quality Management movement of the
mid 1980s, companies in the United States began forming closer
relationships with their suppliers and reducing their supplier
bases to a few high quality suppliers through preferred supplier
programs
.
Quality improvement has been on the corporate radar
screen for more than a decade now. For purchasing
that's meant hours of training in total quality
management techniques, building better relations with a
slimmed down supplier base, and measuring your quality




Presently, most companies have some kind of supplier quality
program working. In fact, 77% of the 503 buying professionals
surveyed by PURCHASING for the November 21, 1996 issue indicated
that they have good supplier involvement programs in place [Ref.
2:p. 1]. Some companies' programs have drastically reduced the
number of suppliers that they deal with. For example, Motorola's
Land Mobile Business cut its supply base from 4,200 suppliers to
250 preferred suppliers [Ref . 3:p. 4].
Another current trend is involving suppliers early in the
product design process in order to reap the benefits of their
specific commodity expertise. As one company surveyed by
Purchasing magazine stated, "We let our suppliers know from the
onset of any relationship that we don't just look for metal to
come through the door, but always are looking for potential cost
reductions and alternative materials" [Ref . 2:p. 9]. Clearly,
buyers are working more closely than ever with suppliers to their
mutual benefit.
2 . Benefits of Supplier Certification Programs
With the increasing popularity of supplier certification
programs, the appropriate question is, what benefits do the
companies and/or their suppliers reap when participating in them?
The benefits for buyers include improved quality, lower
purchasing costs, and improved relationships with suppliers. The
main benefit for suppliers is an increased share of the buying
company' s business along with a longer term commitment from the
buying company.
a. Buyer Benefits
Companies with robust preferred supplier programs
believe that they have significantly improved the quality of
incoming goods. "From the customer's standpoint, the advantage
of a preferred supplier program is plain better quality, " says
Robert Hall, professor of operations management at Indiana
University-Purdue University in Indianapolis. "If I no longer
need to worry about having defective items show up from a
supplier, that shows up in better quality going out to my
customer ." [Ref. 4:p. 24] Improved quality goes a long way toward
cost savings as well as end product improvement.
Nearly every company with a certified supplier program
claims to have significant cost savings from reduced quality
inspections, production interruptions, and streamlined source
selection. Slaninka explains "Suppliers who achieve excellent
product quality also do a better job of managing inventories and
on-time delivery support, they achieve ongoing cost reductions by
improving yields and eliminating inspections ." [Ref . 5:p. 4] With
a supplier base reduced to only high quality suppliers,
purchasing managers can spend less time and effort deciding which
vendor to choose for a particular item. These factors can add up
to significant cost savings for a corporation.
The team concept, together with stringent supplier
performance metrics, has helped Allied Signal get a
handle on quality. Since it began using commodity
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teams in 1992, Allied Signal has reduced the number of
defective goods received from suppliers from 40,000
parts per million (ppm) to 1,902 ppm in early 1996.
Half of the company's 3,000 suppliers already ship
defect-free. And Fred McClintock, corporate vice
president of materials management at Allied Signal,
estimates that these efforts will save his company $1.2
billion over the next three years. [Ref. l:p. 4]
This is the kind of result that has many companies jumping on the
certified supplier bandwagon.
By reducing its supplier base a company will have more
time to work closely with individual suppliers and form better
relationships. Also, by giving particular vendors more business
and a long term commitment, the buyer will make up a larger
portion of that supplier's business which will make them more
responsive to the buyer's needs. One materials purchasing
manager explained it this way:
We have about 350 Developing local suppliers now. Five
years ago, we had two and a half, three times as many.
Now our top 75 suppliers account for 90% of our
purchasing dollars. The top 40 account for two thirds of
our dollars. Before, when we had all those suppliers we
really didn't have the time to work with them. We were
busy processing orders, chasing down shortages, talking
to sales people, and dealing with re-work
problems ... [0] ur business was spread so thin over so many
suppliers (in the past) it wasn't worth that much to any
of them. [Ref. 2:p. 3]
Again, companies will only have the ability to work closely with
suppliers if they have a relativley small number to work with. A
preferred supplier program is a good way to identify the high
quality suppliers that deserve the majority of the business.
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b. Supplier Benefits
Certified suppliers mainly benefit from increased
business from the certifying company and a long term commitment
for orders from the buyer. In theory, certified suppliers have a
big advantage over other companies when competing for contracts.
However, when a supplier is just one of several who are certified
for a particular commodity, the advantage is less obvious. Some
suppliers are less enamored of these programs than the buying
companies. Reaction from equipment vendors is often strongly
negative. "We've been an approved supplier to Du Pont for three
years," comments a marketer with one major pump manufacturer, who
requests anonymity, "and it hasn't done a damned thing for us."
Is there an advantage to being one of several preferred
competitors for an order? "The others will be the guys you've
got to beat anyway," says one disenchanted supplier ." [Ref. 6:
p. 40] Whether suppliers like them or not, these programs are
gaining in popularity and they will probably have to learn to
live with them.
Another benefit enjoyed by suppliers who enter into a
close relationship with a buyer is training in the latest quality
methods, such as statistical process control. From Small
Business Reports:
Big companies also share their operating expertise with
preferred suppliers, and small companies can profit
handsomely from that exchange. Many large companies,
12
for example, have invested heavily in developing
training capabilities in various quality-management
tools. Gaining access to those resources may be worth
even more than the promise of increased sales. [Ref. 4:
p. 25]
The benefits available to a supplier depend on the quality of the
relationship fostered by the program.
3 . Commercial Supplier Certification Methods
All supplier certification programs include vendor rating
systems using various measures of performance. Some programs
also include monitoring of suppliers' quality control systems
and/or quality control training for supplier personnel as
mentioned above.
Vendor rating systems usually include but are not limited to
an evaluation of quality for materials/parts provided and
timeliness of deliveries. Rockwell was one of the first
corporations to develop a systematic approach to vendor ratings.
This program was one of the first in the aerospace
industry to successfully include supplier quality and
schedule performance in a single rating, dollarized to
reflect the cost of poor quality. Jointly administered
by Quality Assurance and the Material Department, the
program is applicable to commercial and military
contractors
.
[Ref . 7:p. 3]
The means used to monitor supplier performance are usually part
of a company' s purchasing system, with automated tracking of
rejections, reworks and deliveries. The purpose of any of these
systems is to identify high quality vendors through their actual
performance record.
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In addition to evaluating actual performance, most supplier
certification programs also require an evaluation of the
supplier's quality control programs and quality improvement
efforts. A strategic sourcing manager for Motorola says, "We
score suppliers on approach to quality, deployment of quality
improvement initiatives, and results ." [Ref. l:p. 3] The buying
companies want to make sure that their preferred suppliers are
committed to continuous quality improvement and cost reduction so
that they can maintain their competitive edge.
Preferred supplier programs are tailored to the type of
commodity being purchased. They seem to work best when applied
to products with simple open specifications. "Preferred supplier
programs succeed when they are limited to procuring commonplace
items with generic specifications . " [Ref . 6:p. 40] This makes
sense because it is impossible to pre-qualify a supplier for a
complex item that has never been produced before.
In summary, companies with supplier certification programs
evaluate a supplier' s actual performance and quality processes to
determine their eligibility for preferred supplier status. They
require from a supplier a commitment to continuous improvement as
well as demonstrated high quality performance and on time
delivery. To a certain extent they will work with promising
suppliers to bring them up to acceptable levels for
14
certification. In return, they expect a commitment by the
supplier to maintain high quality and lower costs.
C. GOVERNMENT LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Federal laws and acquisition regulations provide guidance
for and limitations imposed on all federal procurement actions.
Title 10 U.S. Code contains the laws which apply to Department of
Defense (DoD) procurement. The Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) spells out the acquisition specific regulatory guidance for
all federal agencies. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement and agency specific documents provide more specific
guidance. Until recently, both the law and regulation required
procurements to be based on full and open competition with a few
narrowly defined exceptions. Any effort to create a Government
supplier certification program which excludes all other than
certified suppliers from the source selection process would fly
in the face full and open competition requirements contained in
the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) . However,
recent acquisition reform legislation has increased contracting
officers' discretion in competitive range determination and
softened the requirement for full and open competition. Also,
the FAR now allows for multiyear contracts which gives
contracting officers the ability to make long term commitments to
certified suppliers.
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1 . The Requirement: For Full and Open Competition
CICA and the FAR set forth very specific guidelines for full
and open competition. Title 10 U.S. Code states:
[T]he head of the agency in conducting a procurement
for property or services-
(A) shall obtain full and open competition through the
use of competitive procedures in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter and the modifications to
regulations pursuant to section 2752 of the Competition
in Contracting Act of 1984 (41 U.S.C. 403 note): and
(B) shall use the competitive procedure or combination
of competitive procedures that is best suited under the
circumstances of the procurement
.
[Ref. 8: Sect. 2304]
The FAR part 6.101 states, "(a) 10 U.S.C. 2304 and 41 U.S.C. 253
require, with certain limited exceptions (see Subparts 6.2 and
6.3), that contracting officers shall promote and provide for
full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding
Government contracts. " [Ref . 9:prt. 6.101] A preferred supplier
program which excludes non participants from bidding for
Government contracts clearly violates the intent of these laws
and regulations. The law does allow certain exceptions. These
exceptions, however, are very narrow and do not apply to supplier
certification programs except for, possibly, the exception for
public interest.
(2) Full and open competition need not be provided
for when the agency head determines that it is not in
the public interest in the particular acquisition
concerned.
(c) Limitations.
(1) A written determination to use this authority shall
be made in accordance with Subpart 1.7, by (i) the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army. . . or
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(ii) the head of any other executive agency. This
authority may not be delegated.
(2) The Congress shall be notified in writing of such
determination not less than 30 days before award of the
contract
.
(3) If required by the head of the agency, the
contracting officer shall prepare a justification to
support the determination under paragraph (c) (1) above.
(4) This Determination and Finding (D&F) shall not be
made on a class basis. [Ref. 9:prt. 6.3]
Clearly, this exception is too cumbersome to use regularly
because of the lengthy justification process that must happen on
each contract attempted.
The FAR states that source selection procedures are designed
to:
(a) Maximize competition; (b) Minimize the complexity of
the solicitation, evaluation, and the selection
decision; (c) Ensure impartial and comprehensive
evaluation of offerors' proposals; and (d) Ensure
selection of the source whose proposal has the highest
degree of realism and whose performance is expected to
best meet stated Government requirements [Ref . 9:
prt. 15.603]
.
Requirements (a) and (b) are in direct conflict. Maximizing
competition also makes it more difficult to meet requirement (d)
.
The more proposals that a contracting officer has to evaluate,
the more complex and difficult the source selection process will
be. Commercial companies use supplier certification programs to
simplify this process by limiting competition to a few high
quality suppliers. They retain the element of competition
without making it "Full and Open".
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Congress recognized the need to tailor procurement processes
according to the needs of each program and modified the
requirement for full and open competition in the Federal
Acquisition Reform Act(FARA) of 1995. Full and open competition
is still required but must be implemented in a way that makes
business sense. According to Lynn Bateman of Government Contract
Advisor (GCA) Executive Reports, "The Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) will be amended to insure that the full and open
competition requirement ^is implemented in a manner that is
consistent with the need to efficiently fulfill the Government's
requirements' (emphasis added) . The term ^efficiently fulfill'
is not defined in the act."[Ref. 10:p. 1] . This change opens the
door for practices like preferred supplier programs which
increase the efficiency of the procurement process. FARA also
expands the discretion of the contracting officer in making the
competitive range determination which is discussed in the next
section.
2 . Competitive Range Determination
One way that competition may be legally limited is through
competitive range determination. In competitive negotiation the
FAR allows for a competitive range determination by the
contracting officer to eliminate proposals which do not have a
reasonable chance of winning the bid:
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15.609 Competitive range, (a) The contracting officer
shall determine which proposals are in the competitive
range for the purpose of conducting written or oral
discussion (see 15.610(b)). The competitive range shall
be determined on the basis of cost or price and other
factors that were stated in the solicitation and shall
include all proposals that have a reasonable chance of
being selected for award. When there is doubt as to
whether a proposal is in the competitive range, the
proposal should be included. [Ref. 9:prt. 15.609]
The competitive range determination could allow a contracting
officer to narrow the field to only those contractors who are
certified. However, since the competitive range is supposed to
include any offeror who has a reasonable chance of winning,
narrowing the field that drastically would not be within the
spirit of the regulation.
The language in FARA allows contracting officers to make a
competitive range determination to improve the efficiency of the
source selection process:
Under FAR 15.609 all proposals which have a reasonable
chance of being selected for award are included in the
competitive range. FARA will now permit the contracting
officer to limit the number of proposals in the
competitive range to the greatest number that will
permit an efficient competition among the offerors
rated most highly. This limitation, however, is to be
implemented in accordance with criteria specified in
the solicitation. [Ref . ll:p. 1]
Contracting officers may be able to use this new flexibility to
include only preferred suppliers in the competitive range.
Certification, however, would have to be identified as a
significant source selection criteria in the solicitation.
19
3. Multiyear Contracts
In the past federal regulations discouraged multiyear
contracts. Now, however, acquisition reforms encourage
contracting officers to do what makes the most sense and gets the
best value for the Government. The FAR allows multiyear contracts
provided that they make business sense:
(b) For DoD, NASA, and the Coast Guard, the head of the
agency may enter into a multiyear contract for supplies
if—
(1) The use of such a contract will result in
substantial savings of the total estimated costs of
carrying out the program through annual contracts;
(2) The minimum need to be purchased is expected to
remain substantially unchanged during the contemplated
contract period in terms of production rate,
procurement rate, and total quantities;
(3) There is a stable design for the supplies to be
acquired, and the technical risks associated with such
supplies are not excessive;
(4) There is a reasonable expectation that, throughout
the contemplated contract period, the head of the
agency will request funding for the contract at a level
to avoid contract cancellation; and
(5) The estimates of both the cost of the contract and
the cost avoidance through the use of a multiyear
contract are realistic.
(c) The multiyear contracting method may be used for
the acquisition of supplies or services.
(d) If funds are not appropriated to support the
succeeding years' requirements, the agency must cancel
the contract. [Ref. 9:prt 17.105-1]
Multiyear contracts could allow the kind of long term commitment
to a certified supplier that is the hallmark of current
commercial purchasing systems. However, even with a multiyear
contract, the commitment is uncertain due to the federal budget
process in which Congress authorizes and appropriates funds on an
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annual basis. Still, contractors find multiyear contracts more
attractive than year-to-year contracts because of the stability
they provide. In a Government certified supplier program,
contracting officers could use multiyear contracts as an
effective incentive for contractor participation.
D. GOVERNMENT STUDIES
DoD instituted several programs in the mid 1980s and early
1990s to begin using commercial practices, including awarding
contracts on the basis of factors other than price. In order to
take contractor performance into account for award decisions, the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and two commands within the Army
Materiel Command (AMC) all developed vendor rating systems or
contractor performance certification programs.
In an effort to move towards the buying practices of
private industry, Total Quality Management initiatives
in the late 1980s led to increased efforts to consider
other factors in award decisions .. .As a result, the DLA
vendor rating system (DVRS) has ' been developed. .. [Ref.
12:p. ix]
The DVRS focused mainly on automating the collection of
performance data and contractor ratings. The Army Materiel
Command's Contractor Performance Certification Program CP(2)
focused on contractors' quality processes and controls as well as
performance.
The focus of supplier evaluations was very similar to what
is found in commercial certified supplier systems. The rating
21
systems generally tracked two performance areas, timeliness of
deliveries, and quality of products. "[T]wo high level factors
other than price are measured. Delivery performance, a measure
of the contractor's ability to deliver contract lines on
time. . .Quality performance, measuring historical nonconformance
rates of a contractor'' [Ref . 12:p. ix] . These are exactly the
same as the main criteria used in commercial programs. Two of
the programs also considered the level of expertise and
documented processes in quality control before certifying a
contractor:
Factors evaluated include:...
- Quality system in full compliance with Military
Qualification Standard 9858A.
- Evidence of an effective statistical process control
system for both procured and manufactured materiel.
- An aggressive and continuous effort to improve
quality and productivity. [Ref . 13:p. 8]
All of the programs had a good system for evaluating contractor
performance. The problems for the programs were mainly caused by
the restrictions placed on them by acquisition regulations
requiring open competition and discouraging multiyear
commitments
.
In audits of two of these systems, the U.S. Army Audit
Agency found two major areas that needed improvement. Those
areas are incentives for contractors to become certified, and
continued monitoring of contractors who are already certified.
The agency found that, "Command had not adequately developed the
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incentives for participating in the Program. . . .Also, procedures
were not established to effectively monitor contractors'
performance after certification. " [Ref. 14 :p. i] The only
incentive for contractors to participate in these programs was an
advantage on future source selections. None of the programs
spelled out exactly what that advantage meant:
Materiel Command had not finalized the procedure for
granting advantages to program contractors during the
source selection processes .. .the advantages of
participation in the Program could not be easily
quantified and compared by contractors with the costs
of meeting program prerequisites
.
[Ref . 14:p. 2]
At that time, contracting officers could not limit competition or
easily grant multiyear contracts. Because of the lack of
incentives, some high quality contractors did not seek
certification. "Because identified Program incentives were
lacking, inadequate, or not sufficiently defined, one of
Tank-Automotive Command' s most eligible contractors declined to
participate in the program. " [Ref . 14 :p. 9] Clearly, the lack of
incentives was a major stumbling block for these programs.
E. SUMMARY
The available literature shows that most large commercial
companies have supplier certification programs and that they are
convinced that these programs save money. Typical commercial and
Government programs evaluate performance in terms of timeliness
and quality. A supplier's internal quality programs and
23
processes are also evaluated. Laws and regulations regarding
Government procurement prevent contracting officers from giving
the kinds of advantages to certified suppliers that commercial
companies usually do. However, recent acquisition reform
legislation, including FARA, may make it easier to give certified
suppliers a longer term commitment and concrete advantages in the
source selection process.
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III. PRESENTATION OF DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
Government and civilian acquisition professionals shed much
light on current efforts to implement certified supplier programs
in both federal procurement and commercial purchasing activities.
They make many germane points about cost, benefits, incentives,
certification criteria, and significant problems with supplier
certification programs in the federal procurement environment.
For this research, data was collected from procurement
professionals involved with several Government and commercial
preferred supplier programs including: the Air Force Blue Ribbon
Contractor Program, the Navy Blue Star Program, the Army CP(2)
Program, and defense contractors' supplier certification
programs. Most of the comments confirmed the conclusions reached
in the preceding literature review, but there were also several
interesting points made concerning the relative worth of
Government programs.
B. OTHER SERVICE PROGRAMS
Until recently, both the Air Force and Navy ran programs
which had features similar to commercial preferred supplier
programs. The Air Force used the Blue Ribbon Contractor Program
and the Navy had the Blue Star Program. For separate reasons,
neither program is currently in use.
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1 . The Air Force Blue Ribbon Contractor Program
The Air Force Blue Ribbon Contractor program allowed
contracting officers to make awards for certain contracts to a
contractor other than the low bidder provided the contractor
selected was a blue ribbon contractor and the low bidder was not,
The pertinent Air Force Manual outlines the program this way:
5315.60590 The AFMC Blue Ribbon Program.
(a) General:
(1) The Blue Ribbon Program (BRP) is a best value
contracting technique that provides a framework for Air
Logistics Center (ALC) contracting officers to exercise
business judgment in awarding contracts for Federal
Supply Class (FSC) items that are normally awarded on
the basis of price alone. It recognizes that among
responsible offerors, varying degrees of quality and
delivery performance exist and that award to the lowest
evaluated price offeror is not always in the best
interest of the Government. Upon application and
approval, those contractors meeting the BRP criteria
will be designated as Blue Ribbon Contractors (BRCs)




The Blue Ribbon Contractor Program based certification on
performance in two areas, quality and timely delivery. It did
not assess a contractor's quality management programs or
processes. Contracting officers could award contracts to Blue
Ribbon Contractors at a price up to 20% higher than a non-Blue
Ribbon Contractor. In order to do this, however, contracting
officers had to write a justification of their decision to award
the contract based on best value rather than lowest price. The
excessive requirement for documentation of decisions as well as
26
the administrative burden of tracking blue ribbon suppliers and
applicants caused the demise of the program.
The Air Force recently canceled the program because it
simply was not used enough to justify the expense of maintaining
the records. Roger Hanson, who wrote the white paper
recommending termination of the program, felt that the program
was too bureaucratic. It placed too much administrative burden
on the contracting officers and, thus, was not supported as well
as it might have been. [Ref . 16] The Air Force made only a small
fraction of eligible contract awards based on best value during
the program. Hanson's white paper put it this way:
Last year approximately 4,600 competitive, negotiated
awards were made for replenishment spares at the five
ALCs; however, the total Blue Ribbon awards were still
a small percentage (6.4 percent) of the total ALC pool
and true "best value" awards (awards with a price
differential) represent only a tiny percentage of
potential Blue Ribbon awards. [Ref. 17:p. 2]
Because very few contractors received a source selection
advantage from the program, the only real incentive for
participation was the positive public exposure and recognition
gained through the award[Ref. 16]. Hanson also felt that the
program worked best in commands where the process was streamlined
to make administration less burdensome and one person was put in
charge of, and thus made an advocate for, the program [Ref . 16]
.
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2 . The Navy Blue Star Program
The Navy Blue Star Program was a recognition program for
contractors who demonstrated outstanding performance. Like the
Air Force Blue Ribbon Contractor Program, the Blue Star award was
based on product quality and timely delivery. The programs
differed, however, in that the Navy did not attempt to give Blue
Star contractors any advantage in the source selection process.
It was simply a "bragging rights" award to publicly recognize
contractors with superior performance. As Bob Zoglio, an
engineer with product quality directorate at the Navy Inventory
Control Point Philadelphia put it, "The fact is that contractors
loved bragging rights, and, if they get our award, they put it in
their hallway where all their subcontractors can see it... they
liked it a lot."[Ref. 18] Like the Air Force program, the Blue
Star Program did not evaluate a contractor' s programs and
processes but concentrated strictly on performance.
The Blue Star Program is currently on hold because the Navy
is implementing a new system for rating contractors, called a
Contractor Report Card, in order to comply with the new
requirement for evaluation of past performance in the source
selection process. This report card includes ratings on
production lead time and innovative contracting as well as the
quality and timeliness included in the old program. [Ref. 18] The
Navy felt it was best to put the program on hold until enough
evaluations are done with the Contractor Report Card to
distinguish between contractors under the new criteria. It is
possible that some source selection advantage may accrue to
awardees under the new system. In any case, awardees should have
superior ratings for past performance.
C. THE ARMY CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE CERTIFICATION PROGRAM
[CP(2)]
Army Materiel Command's (CP) 2 program seeks to improve AMC's
supplier base through a joint Government/contractor effort:
The (CP)2 was initially established in 1985 and was
standardized across AMC with the publication of AMC
Pamphlet (AMC-PAM) 715-16 in January 1995.
1. The purpose of (CP)2 is to improve supplier quality
and promote continuous quality improvement of AMC
contractors and facilities through cooperative effort
between AMC, Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC)
and contractors. Through (CP)2, AMC reviews a
contractor's quality, production/manufacturing,
management, and, where appropriate, design/development
processes at a specified facility under the criteria
established in AMC-PAM 715-16. Those facilities
meeting or exceeding the specified requirements gain
certification. [Ref. 19:p. 1]
(CP)2 is a recognition program like the Air Force and Navy
programs, but it emphasizes programs and processes used to manage
quality more than actual performance. Army acquisition
professionals at various commands within AMC gave their opinions
on the effectiveness of the program and the significant problems
associated with it. Quality managers with AMC suppliers also
gave their perspectives on the program. The main areas of
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concern were: benefits to the Army versus costs, incentives for
contractor participation, and certification criteria. Many of
the people interviewed had suggestions for improvement in these
areas.
1 . Benefits To The Army
The Army feels that the CP(2) program provides higher
quality products, better relationships with and quicker response
from contractors, and lower oversight and inspection costs.
Measuring these benefits in relationship to the program costs is
difficult because many of the benefits are hard to quantify.
Higher quality products are the most obvious benefit of
(CP)2. Celia Hadden of AMC's Industrial Operations Command
(IOC) , an advocate of the program, put it this way:
I think that obviously with the contractors that we've
got in the program, by going through the process and
then continuing with their continuous improvement
program, we improve the quality of the products that
they are delivering to us. We have an improved
partnering relationship with that contractor. What
we've seen also is that because, at least in our
segment of the industry, the program is so well known
that we really feel that it raises the benchmark for




Most of the professionals interviewed agreed that higher quality
products are a definite benefit of the program. The positive
impact of the higher quality products delivered is, however,
difficult to quantify.
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Another benefit of the (CP)2 program mentioned by Celia
Hadden is closer partnerships with contractors. This parallels
the longer term commitment and close relationships found in
commercial certified supplier programs. This in turn allows the
Army to reduce oversight and quality assurance costs. The AMC
(CP)2 pamphlet describes the benefit this way:
The program will allow the Government to reduce
oversight over certified facilities, thereby greatly
reducing attendant administrative costs. Limited
Government resources can be redirected toward
contractors in greater need of assistance. As (CP)2
expands into other functional areas, further reductions
in oversight of certified contractors will be achieved.
[Ref. 21]
Mike Ryskamp of the Army's Communications and Electronics Command
(CECOM) felt that this was one quantifiable benefit of (CP)2 to
the Army. On the other hand, he also pointed out that the
general trend in federal procurement is toward less oversight
anyway. Even if (CP)2 or other programs make less oversight
necessary, oversight will decrease because of constrained
resources and acquisition reform. Therefore, the actual benefit
may be negligible. [Ref . 22] There was general agreement among
the Army procurement professionals involved with (CP)2 that
reduced oversight and reduced inspection costs are a positive
result from the program.
In summary, none of the people contacted dispute the
benefits of (CP)2 for the Government. What is lacking is a way
31
to quantify these benefits and compare them to the costs of
administering (CP)2.
2 . Incentives And Benefits In (CP) 2 For Contractors
The benefits for contractors in (CP)2 are outlined in the
AMC (CP)2 pamphlet:
Perhaps the greatest benefit to a contractor from the
(CP)2 process is the improvement that occurs in his
processes and procedures. The (CP)2 process drives
contractors to improve their processes, and then to
continue improving these after certification. The
result of improved processes is seen in the metrics
used as an overall improvement of the contractor's
efficiency. Savings are seen in reduced scrap, rework,
cycle times, elimination of non-value-added efforts,
and overall increase in yields and the quality of end
items.... The contractor gains the ability to have the
Government participate on a noncontractual basis and
team with them to provide a customer viewpoint of where
they can improve their process.... This leads to better
systems and a more satisfied customer.... There are
several areas of potential recognition for a certified
contractor.... The contractor has the right to
advertise his certification. As part of the
certification, the contractor is awarded a plaque and
flag that signifies that the Army has recognized him as
an excellent contractor. This recognition may be used
by potential customers when deciding whether to place
orders with the company. . . . The certification process
and award have been shown to be a morale builder for
the contractor's employees.... ISO 9000 standards are
the foundation of the (CP)2 process.... Certification
under (CP)2 is a recognition by the Army that the
contractor meets all the criteria of the appropriate
ISO standard. [Ref . 21]
AMC feels that the number one benefit to the contractor from
(CP)2 is improved internal processes which make the company more
competitive. The pamphlet also includes a section on program
incentives:
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Incentives for Contractor Performance Certification
1) - First Article Test Waiver/Reduction
2) - Waiving Government Review of Acceptance Inspection
Equipment (AIE) Design by the Government
3) - Contractor Use of Statistical Process Control
Without Prior Government Approval
4) - Reduction of Deliverable Data Approval Criteria
Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) Documents
5) - Flow Down of Incentives to (CP)2 Certified
Subcontractors [Ref. 21]
Most of these incentives reduce administrative costs of the
certified contractor. The question is, are these benefits and
incentives sufficient to encourage participation by most
contractors? Procurement officials in both Government and
private industry had a wide variety of answers to that question.
The general consensus on both sides of the street is that
the current incentives are inadequate. This is a long standing
problem in Government certified supplier programs as was pointed
out in the literature review. In contrast, some (CP)2
participants felt that the improvement in their internal
processes was a great benefit to their companies. Jeff Elliot,
Quality Manager for Nuclear Metals, said that (CP)2 provides his
company with a good framework for running process control,
product quality management, continuous process improvement, and
ultimately improving customer satisfaction [Ref . 23]. Parvez
Siddiqi, Director of Product Assurance at Pentastar Electronics,
saw improvements in his company' s processes which lead to
improved quality and on time delivery as a result of (CP)2
33
[Ref . 24] . Steve Torma of Primex Corporation also felt that his
company's main benefit from (CP)2 was improved internal processes
which made them a lower cost, more competitive contractor [Ref
.
25] . All three of these gentlemen also agreed that a concrete
advantage in the source selection process would be an even
greater incentive for participation.
This was a consistent theme with nearly everyone
interviewed. Both Government and civilian procurement
professionals agreed that if contractors gained a competitive
advantage by being (CP)2 certified, they would be much more
likely to put forth the effort necessary to join the program.
Both Celia Hadden of IOC and Mike Ryskamp of CECOM said that
contractors would be '"knocking our door down" to get into the
program if they could gain an advantage in source selection [Ref
s
20,22]. Bulova is a former (CP)2 certified company which dropped
the program. Bill Mohler, Director of Quality Assurance at
Bulova, said that Bulova did not renew its commitment to (CP)2
because they had hoped for an advantage in bid and proposal
activities for best value procurements which never materialized,
"We weren't reaping any benefits so, in all honesty, we decided
to drop it." [Ref. 26] He later said that Bulova would be very
interested in rejoining the program if it would give them a
concrete advantage in source selection. The quality manager at
Radford Army Ammunition Plant, a Government owned contractor
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operated facility which is in the process of becoming (CP)2
certified, also agreed that any competitive advantage would be a
significant incentive to participate in the program[Ref. 27].
IOC has already initiated a plan to grant an advantage in
the source selection process to (CP)2 certified contractors.
Their memorandum requesting a GAO advisory opinion states,
Because (CP)2 certified contractors have demonstrated
that they are quality producers, we would now like to
expand the program to provide benefits to (CP)2
certified contractors in the source selection process.
A description of the (CP)2 program, including our
proposed source selection incentives, are provided at
enclosure 2. Because these source selection incentives
represent a change in the way we solicit and evaluate
competitive procurements, we want to ensure that GAO
will not view the incentives as improperly restricting
competition. Therefore, we request your support in
seeking an advisory opinion from GAO in order to
confirm the propriety of implementing the incentives as
proposed. A draft memorandum forwarding this request
to GAO is provided at enclosure 3.[Ref. 28]
This will be a great help to the program if AMC can avoid the
appearance of restricting competition.
The other incentive that most of the people interviewed
agreed would be attractive to contractors is eligibility for
longer term contracts. Longer term contracts allow companies to
better plan ahead and further increase their efficiency.
Primex' s quality manager indicated that his company considered
long term contracts extremely desirable because of the stability
they provide [Ref. 25]. This incentive is only partially
applicable to Government procurement because long term contracts
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are only applicable where there is a bona fide long term
requirement for the item.
In summary, the benefits and incentives for contractors
participating in the (CP)2 program are sufficient for some
contractors, especially those who stand to benefit from
improvements in their internal processes. Contractors who
already have good quality and continuous improvement processes in
place, however, do not have much incentive for joining the
program or continuing in it once certified. Further incentives,
such as a concrete advantage in competitive source selection and
longer term commitments to certified contractors, would make the
program much more attractive to all Government contractors.
3. Certification Criteria
The certification criteria for (CP)2 are based on ISO 9001
standards with additional requirements. The AMC (CP)2 pamphlet
lays out the general requirements:
This chapter is patterned after the criteria of ISO
9001, Quality Systems - Model For Quality Assurance
in Design/Development, Production, Installation and
Services (Second edition 1994). In addition to the
criteria of ISO 9001, this chapter includes criteria
for customer satisfaction, quality costs, warranty,
ethics, business planning, environmental, safety and a
plan for continuous improvement
.
[Re f. 21]
These requirements are mostly process oriented. They ensure that
the contractor has the systems and processes in place to
constantly monitor and improve quality. Some of the procurement
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professionals interviewed agreed that the emphasis of the (CP)2
evaluation should be on processes. Others thought that the
criteria should also include evaluation of a contractor' s actual
performance in terms of quality and timely delivery.
Celia Hadden of IOC indicated that (CP)2 is focused on
processes but also requires contractors to track their
performance through their own system of metrics. She felt that a
ridged point system of rating contractors for quality performance
based on Government metrics is no longer appropriate given recent
guidance on past performance. [Ref. 29] This may come from the
desire to impose fewer requirements on contractors as a part of
acquisition reform. Companies involved in the (CP)2 program
agree that it is mainly process oriented.
Other people feel that there should be a better balance
between performance and process assessment for certification.
This would more closely mirror commercial programs which place a
heavier emphasis on performance while helping their preferred
suppliers improve processes. George Hanna, an analyst for the
Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) who is developing
the business case for (CP)2, agreed that it should look more
closely at actual performance parameters [Ref . 29].
D. COMMERCIAL CERTIFIED SUPPLIER PROGRAMS
Several of the commercial companies contacted had certified
or preferred supplier programs. These programs were very similar
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to the types found in the current literature. The quality
managers interviewed gave good descriptions of the benefits their
companies realized from the programs as well as the incentives to
suppliers and the assessment criteria used in their programs.
There are several lessons from their observations which may be
applicable to Government certified supplier programs.
1 . Benefits To Purchasers
One of the major benefits that the companies contacted get
from their certified supplier programs is cost avoidance. One
Director of Quality Assurance commented that it is difficult to
capture the real cost of a bad supplier [Ref. 26]. One area of
cost avoidance is the cost of inspecting incoming products.
Talley Defense has a system called the Partner's in Excellence
Program in which the preferred suppliers ship directly to stock
with little or no inspection. Larry Watt, Talley' s Director of
Quality, says, "The most expensive time to find out whether a
part is good or bad is when it is taken off a truck by our
receiver ." [Ref . 30] In the same vein Parvez Siddiqi, Quality
Manager for Pentastar, said that the cost of dealing with their
certified suppliers was very low while the cost of dealing with
their lower quality suppliers was very high [Ref. 24]. This was
not the only benefit cited, but it was the one mentioned most
often. Other benefits include a dedicated, committed supplier
base that will give priority to the company's work.
2.
Supplier Incentives And Benefits
The main supplier benefit offered by commercial companies
is increased business. Talley Defense gives its partners in
excellence extra points on competitive bids and intends to offer
them preference on long term contracts [Ref. 30]. Pentastar also
gives their certified suppliers preference on contracts. They
will often reduce the number of suppliers for a given commodity
from several to two or three certified suppliers
.
[Ref . 24]
Talley Defense also assists its partners in excellence by working
with them to improve their pre-shipment quality[Ref. 30]. These
benefits and incentives have worked well for the companies
involved. Again, the most powerful incentive for the suppliers
is additional business.
3 . Certification Process And Criteria
The preferred supplier systems mentioned in this study
generally included evaluations of both processes and performance.
Larry Watt, Director of Quality Assurance for Talley Defense,
describes their system this way:
It's a blend of both [process and performance]. It
requires him [the supplier] to get a purchase order,
complete the purchase order, and to send us the
hardware with zero defects and all of the proper
certifications. He has to do that over a period of
time and send us in at least three shipments with zero
defects. Also, I have two people, .. .both of whom are
solid quality people. Both of them can go out and work
with a vendor, and help him set up his program. . . . With
the idea being, assist the vendor to make good parts
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rather than send them into us and we'll inspect them
and find they're bad.[Ref. 30]
Pentastar certified suppliers must pass through several levels of
evaluation. They are initially screened to see if they have
suitable quality systems in place and financial stability. If
they pass the initial screening, they are issued an order for a
small lot and Pentastar does first article testing and close
scrutiny of this lot. If the first lot is good, the supplier may
receive further orders which are monitored as well. If they
demonstrate sufficient performance over time, they become
certified suppliers
.
[Ref. 24] Bulova also has a preferred
supplier program. Interestingly, they see the requirements
placed on them as a defense contractor in the form of small
business set asides and required competition on subcontracts as a
hindrance to applying best value to their purchases
.
[Ref . 26]
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
The final question asked in each interview was whether the
person had any suggestions for improvement, mainly for (CP)2 but
also for certified supplier programs in general. The respondents
came up with some interesting common themes. Government
officials generally felt that the program would be greatly
improved by including a source selection advantage for certified
suppliers. Contractors agreed. A contractor who was going
through the process of certification and one who had just
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finished both felt that it took too long. Contractors and the
Government would benefit more by getting contractors on the road
to high quality and continuous process improvement sooner. Part
of the problem was resource constraints within IOC.[Refs. 23,27]
Two of the companies also felt that the (CP)2 criteria should be
scrapped in favor of ISO 9001 standards so that contractors would
not be held to multiple standards [Refs . 26,30].
F. SUMMARY
The table below summarizes, in general terms, the data
gathered for this study through interviews with procurement
professionals
.
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Government and commercial procurement professionals provided
valuable insights into the current state of certified supplier
programs in the Government and industry. Their views help to
gain a more complete picture of the practices and techniques,
both successful and unsuccessful, which are currently in use. In
the following chapter these observations are analyzed to




This chapter provides analysis of the data gathered for
chapters two and three. The previous chapters identified some of
the problems with the current certified supplier system in the
Army. These chapters also identified some possible solutions to
the problems and improvements that could be made to the program
by examining similar Government and commercial programs. The
purpose of this chapter is to analyze these alternatives and
determine which are the best and most applicable to the Army'
s
procurement system.
The problems with the Army's CP(2) program fall into four
main categories: Lack of strong incentives for contractors to
participate in the program, lack of objective performance
requirements for certification, burdensome additional
requirements placed on contractors, and lack of measurable
benefits and costs from which the program can be justified.
Examination of other DoD programs and commercial programs
provided some possible solutions for all of these problems except
measuring costs and benefits.
The barriers to the program' s success are mainly regulatory
rather than cultural. Even those procurement officials who do
not think the program is worthwhile believe that it can work if
the incentive problem can be overcome. No one interviewed felt
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that cultural resistance within the Army was a problem for the
program. Most of those interviewed feel that the requirements
for competition imposed by CICA are a substantial barrier to the
program.
A. CONTRACTOR INCENTIVES
1 . The Problem
Lack of contractor incentives is the most important problem
with the current CP(2) program. Certified suppliers in
commercial programs generally enjoy a substantial advantage in
obtaining new business and long term contracts. The CP(2)
program does not currently provide certified suppliers with any
advantage in the source selection process or attempt to reward
the supplier with long term contracts. CP(2) does help
contractors improve their internal quality processes and provides
public recognition for certified contractors. It also relieves
certified contractors of some administrative burdens. These
minor incentives are enough for some companies, especially those
who do not have mature quality assurance processes in place and
who need assistance in setting up a good quality program. There
is no real incentive, however, for contractors who already have
mature quality assurance and continuous improvement programs in
place. For these companies CP(2) is simply an additional burden
and not worth the cost of participation. Arguably, these
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companies are the ones the Army would most like to have as
certified suppliers.
2 . Solutions
As previously noted, the IOC is already attempting to give
certified contractors an advantage during source selection [Ref.
19] . This is the best incentive to bring contractors into the
program. If they know that their chance of winning future
contracts is significantly increased through certification, they
will be much more interested in joining the program. The problem
with giving certified contractors a competitive edge in source
selection is that contracting officers must still comply with
requirements for full and open competition. Non-certified
contractors must be given the same opportunities to compete for
and win contracts as certified contractors. In order to make
certification an advantage in source selection, the certification
requirements must be included in some form in the solicitation as
either a requirement or a significant evaluation factor. If it
is a significant evaluation factor, certified suppliers can
automatically be given maximum points for that evaluation factor.
Non-certified suppliers can be evaluated and given a score based
on the degree of their compliance with certification
requirements. This method should avoid the possibility of
protests since all offerors will be evaluated on the same
criteria and competition will not be automatically restricted.
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Making certification a requirement on a solicitation is
probably not possible under current law. To avoid restricting
competition the contracting officer would have to make the
equivalent of certification as well as certification a
requirement. This should be possible on contracts that have high
quality and/or on-time delivery requirements. In this case, the
risk to the Government is such that the contracting officer can
justify requiring contractors to have mature quality control
systems in place. Also, contracting officers can use the
competitive range determination to narrow the field in these
cases to contractors who are certified or have equivalent systems
in place. By narrowing the field they reduce the effort
necessary in the source selection and reap one of the potential
benefits of the program. These methods are only practical in
cases where quality is important enough to the success of the
procurement that certification or its equivalent can be one of
the major evaluation factors for source selection.
Commercial preferred supplier systems use long term
commitments to certified suppliers as another incentive to give
certified suppliers more business [Refs. 24,26,30]. The Army can
only do long term contracts when there is a bona fide long term
requirement for the item being purchased. On buys where the Army
can make a long term commitment, it makes sense to award the
contract to a contractor with a proven quality record, a world
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class quality assurance program and a commitment to continuous
improvement- Contracting officers can easily justify requiring
certification or its equivalent on solicitations for long term
contracts.
The CP(2) program does not currently require a demonstrated
level of past performance quality [Ref. 21]. If it were included,
a performance requirement could help to justify using
participation in the program as an evaluation factor in
solicitations. This is because past performance is now a major
part of most source selection decisions. The lack of performance
criteria in CP(2) is discussed in the next section.
In summary, the current acquisition reform environment
should allow the Army to provide better incentives for
participation in the CP(2) program. Specifically, the Army can
give certified suppliers a concrete advantage during source
selection for contracts on which quality and on-time delivery are
essential. These include long term contracts which are very
attractive to contractors. The incentives already in place are
not adequate for contractors that already have excellent quality
systems in place. The better incentives should bring them on
board. For contractors who need help with their quality systems,
the assistance that the program supplies is still a good
incentive. By helping these contractors to improve their quality
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the Army improves the quality of the supplier base and increases
the number of high quality suppliers.




CP(2) requires certified contractors to continuously track
their quality internally through their own quality metrics. The
larger focus of the program is on the contractor's processes and
programs. There is no requirement for the contractor to
demonstrate consistent high quality performance or on-time
delivery. [Ref . 21] Most commercial programs require both a
defined quality management program and demonstrated performance
to obtain the highest level of certification [Refs. 24,26,30].
Processes and programs help a company to achieve high quality
output, but the only real proof that a contractor can deliver
high quality products in a timely manner is their actual
performance. CP(2) does not include any external measurement of
a contractors' performance on deliveries to the Government.
2 . Solutions
In order to make sure that the Government will get the
benefit of high quality supplier performance from this program,
CP(2) should include some objective measures of performance as
criteria for certification. The two areas of performance most
commonly evaluated in both Government and commercial certified
supplier programs are quality level and timeliness of deliveries
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[Refs 12,13,24,26, etc.]. Both of these factors are as important
to the Army as they are to commercial companies. Low quality
means that soldiers in the field are getting equipment that is
not as good as it should be and/or the Army quality assurance
inspectors are spending a lot of time and money inspecting
quality in and rejecting lots that require rework. A contractor
who does not deliver on time causes delays in fielding and a
myriad of other problems that occur when schedules are pushed
back because needed materiel has not been delivered.
Minimum standards for quality and timeliness in particular
business areas are easy to develop. The problem is the expense
involved with monitoring performance. In today's environment of
shrinking budgets and reduced oversight, a solution that requires
more inspectors and bureaucracy is dead on arrival. Fortunately,
the Army and other Government agencies already track quality and
delivery performance through contract administration activities
conducted by DCMC. CP(2) should be able to tap into this
information without significant further investment. By using
metrics already in place, the Army can also avoid burdening the
contractors with further requirements. Contractors should prove
their ability to meet high performance standards before being
fully certified.
The CP(2) evaluation of processes and programs is also valid
and value added. Performance, however, is important enough that
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it should also be evaluated. In order to facilitate this, both
evaluations should be required to obtain full certification. The
commercial systems evaluated were often two tiered. Suppliers
gained an initial certification based on a buyer evaluation of
their quality programs. They only obtained full certified status
after a significant period of demonstrated high performance.
[Refs. 24-26,30] This is a good model and an appropriate
approach for the Army system as well.
In summary, CP(2) can be improved by requiring evaluation of
past performance in terms of quality and timely delivery for full
certification. The Army can benefit more from a system in which
contractors can get certified on both the processes and
performance. This would make it easier to provide a source
selection advantage for fully certified suppliers because of the
past performance evaluation. More importantly, it will provide a
better assurance of high quality performance from certified
suppliers than the heavily process oriented program currently in
place. Process certification modeled on ISO 9001 standards is
still important and provides the benefits of process improvement
to suppliers without mature quality programs. Also, the
performance evaluation will work best if it is done using
currently available performance metrics that do not place an
additional burden on either the Government or contractors.
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Contractors who already have fully developed quality
management systems in place see CP(2) requirements as an
additional, unnecessary drain on their resources. If they are
already ISO 9001 certified and have a proven track record of
performance what value does CP(2) certification add to their
company? [Refs . 25,30] CP(2) is based on ISO 9001 requirements
but adds several unique requirements as wellfRef. 21]. At the
same time, acquisition reform encourages less oversight and fewer
unique requirements. It stands to reason that contractors who do
business with customers other than the Army have no desire to
participate in a program that includes service unique
requirements
.
Also, some of the companies who were certified or were going
through certification felt that the process took too long because
of constrained resources at AMC. Inspection teams had a full
schedule and return inspections to review problem areas took a
long time to schedule. [Refs. 23,27] The resource problem will
only get worse if the program becomes more popular and more
companies try to become certified.
2 . Solutions
Contractor's objections to the unique requirements of CP(2)
can easily be overcome by removing the requirements above ISO
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9001 standards. This would also help to ease the strain on
certification teams because AMC personnel can work in conjunction
with DCMC personnel who can also certify compliance with ISO 9001
standards. The CP(2) requirements above and beyond ISO 9001 are
in the program for good reasons. Their value, however, may not
exceed the additional cost in compliance for the contractors and
monitoring for the Army. Eliminating service unique requirements
is one of the main goals of the Single Process Initiative (SPI)
,
one of the latest acquisition reform initiatives
.
[Ref. 31] The
basic idea behind SPI is that defense contractors are able to
operate much more efficiently in a particular facility if all of
the agency or service specific requirements are done away with in
favor of one common requirement or specification. They do not
have to completely retool for different products or run separate
production lines for each customer. Thus, costs are lowered and
everyone saves money. The same concept can be applied to the
CP(2) program and other Government supplier certification
programs. By adopting ISO 9001 certification as the standard for
all Government programs, the Army and other services and agencies
can save a lot of redundant effort. Contractors would have one
standard to meet which is recognized in the commercial world as
well as in Government procurement.
Using ISO 9001 without additional requirements for process
and program certification would also help with certification team
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resources which would speed up the certification process
.
Besides DCMC teams, many commercial ISO 9001 teams are available
to certify contractors who are in a hurry to obtain certification
if they are willing to pay the price. Contractors would have
much less trouble becoming certified for CP(2) if the unique
requirements were taken out of the program. Even so, holding
them to the ISO 9001 standard should ensure that they have a
stringent quality management system in place. What the CP(2)
program would lose is the value of including those requirements
above and beyond ISO 9001.
The ISO 9001 certification, like CP(2), focuses on processes
rather than performance. Therefore, CP(2) could not rely on ISO
9001 to evaluate actual performance. Performance evaluation
would be done through the existing Government metrics mentioned
in the previous section.
In summary, the Army could save a lot of time and effort for
both contractors and the Government by eliminating process and
program requirements not included in the ISO 9001 standard from
the CP(2) program. The additional requirements do add value to
the program, but probably not enough to justify the costs of
evaluating and complying with them. High quality contractors who
are already ISO 9001 certified would be more likely to join the
program. Also, the Army would gain certification assistance from
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other agencies and commercial enterprises which will make the
process faster.
D. MEASURABLE COSTS AND BENEFITS
1 . The Problem
Like all Government programs CP(2) must be scrutinized to
see if the benefits outweigh the costs. The cost to the Army of
running the program would be relatively easy to capture. The
costs includes personnel for administration of the programming,
training, travel, etc. The benefits, however, are harder to
quantify. Reduced oversight costs can be measured, but the Army
is reducing oversight anyway in response to funding cuts. Much
of the worth in a certified supplier program lies in avoiding the
cost of doing business with bad suppliers and avoided cost is
always hard to measure.
A bad supplier is costly in many ways: delayed deliveries,
disrupted schedules, increased inspection costs, cost of rejected
lots, etc. These costs cannot be easily quantified. Remember,
though, that the companies who have certifed or preferred
supplier programs use them to reduce their supplier base so that
they do not have to do business with bad suppliers
.
[Ref. 25]
Another benefit of supplier certification programs,
especially ones like CP(2) that include continuous improvement
for suppliers, is the overall higher quality that the buyer will
see in the products they purchase. For the Army that translates
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to better and more reliable weapons systems, trucks, tents, and
everything else that is necessary to fight and win this nation'
s
wars. The difference in value between a good quality boot and
one of poor quality is obvious to light infantrymen, but they
probably could not give you a dollar figure.
2 . Solutions
Although it may be hard to quantify the benefits of a
supplier certification program, the benefits are, nonetheless,
real and substantial. There are some ways to measure the
effectiveness of a supplier certification program in terms of its
use relative to the total supplier base.
Some of the metrics that may be useful in determining the
effectiveness of the CP(2) program are found in the Air Force
Blue Ribbon Program. That program was canceled because it was
not used enough to justify the cost. They measured the
percentage of contracts given to Blue Ribbon Contractors and they
measured the percentage of contract awards that were made to Blue
Ribbon Contractors on a best value decision. [Ref. 17] For CP(2)
the percentage of all AMC contractors participating in the
program is one measure that can easily be tracked. As the
program matures the percentage of AMC suppliers participating
should rise. More importantly, if certified suppliers are given
an advantage in source selection, the percentage of contracts
awarded to certified suppliers should also rise. If either of
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these percentages is insignificant or decreases over time, the
program is probably not having much positive effect on the
quality of the AMC supplier base or the quality of incoming
materiel. Also, as the certified suppliers gain an advantage in
the source selection process, the percentage of contracts that
are awarded to certified suppliers with a price differential will
indicate whether the program is being used to make best value
decisions. Also, the same metrics used to determine whether or
not a contractor meets the high performance standards required
for certification can be used to compare the performance of
certified suppliers to non-certified suppliers. None of these
measures, however, will capture the actual costs and benefits of
the program.
In summary, the dollar costs and benefits of a certified
supplier program are extremely difficult to measure and compare.
Measurements of the program 7 s use and comparison of contractors
in and out of the program, though, are useful in determining if
it is having a significant positive effect on the organization's
buying activities.
E. SUMMARY
Analysis of the data gathered for this study shows that many
of the problems associated with running a certified supplier
program in the Army procurement system spring from regulatory
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restrictions requiring full and open competition. Recent
acquisition reforms may allow the Army CP(2) program to use more
commercial practices that could strengthen the program and
provide more benefits for the Government and contractors. Better
incentives for participation, most notably a source selection
advantage, should attract more and better suppliers to the
program. Other improvements could increase the efficiency of the
program through cooperation with other Government agencies.
CP(2) could also be made more attractive for contractors by
eliminating some of its unique requirements. It is difficult to
reduce the benefits of the program down to a dollar figure, but
there are several benefits which are probably more than worth the
cost of running the program. Specific recommendations for




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Analysis of the data gathered and the current literature
reviewed for this study did not reveal any particularly startling
conclusions- Nevertheless, the analysis does point out some
areas of the Army's CP(2) program that can be improved through
specific action. This chapter sets forth the major conclusions
of the study as well as specific recommendations for
consideration by AMC. Additionally, it addresses each of the
research questions and provides summarized answers.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions reached in this research are: (1) the
current incentives for participation in the Army's CP(2) program
are inadequate, (2) the main barriers to providing adequate
incentives are the competition requirements imposed by CICA, (3)
evaluation of contractor performance is an essential part of
successful supplier certification programs, (4) quantitative
evaluation of the actual dollar costs and benefits of supplier
certification programs is extremely difficult, and (5) the CP(2)
unique requirements beyond ISO 9001 are onerous to contractors
and not worth the additional effort required on both sides.
1 . Inadequate Incentives
Interviews with non-certified contractors clearly showed
that many contractors do not feel that CP(2) is a good deal for
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them. The cost of becoming certified is not justified by the
gains currently realized by certified contractors. Commercial
certified suppliers generally get more business and longer term
orders from their buyers. All of the contractors and Government
officials interviewed felt that, if CP(2) offered an advantage to
certified contractors in winning more contracts in the future,
this would be a much greater incentive for participation than the
current CP(2) incentives.
2 . Barriers
The main barrier to making CP(2) more attractive to
contractors by giving them a source selection advantage is CICA.
The requirement for full and open competition makes it difficult
to give any contractor a concrete advantage based solely on their
certified status. Recent relaxation of the strict full and open
competition requirement, however, may allow contracting officers
enough flexibility to give certified suppliers some advantages.
There are no discernible cultural barriers within the Army
procurement community to giving certified suppliers more
contracts. Most of the officials interviewed think it is a good
idea that makes good business sense.
3 . Performance Assessment
In all of the commercial certified supplier systems
examined, certified suppliers are required to prove their ability
to perform to stringent quality and on time delivery standards.
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CP(2) does not require an external evaluation of contractors'
performance, rather, it focuses on quality programs and
processes. Good quality management processes are valuable, but
they do not necessarily guarantee excellent performance.
Assessment of actual performance is a must in order to have
confidence in certified suppliers.
4 . Cost And Benefit
The benefits of CP(2) or any certified supplier program are
substantial, but hard to directly quantify. The money the
Government saves in reduced oversight can be measured, but cost
avoidance from eliminating low quality suppliers and the value of
higher quality products to the soldier in the field are more
difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, the Army can use
measurements of program participation and comparison of the
certified and non-certified suppliers to determine if the program
is having any discernible positive effect on the supplier base
and the quality of incoming goods.
5. CP(2) Unique Requirements
The Army's requirements for CP(2) certification are based on
ISO 9001, but go beyond what is required for that standard.
Contractors who are already ISO 9001 certified see little value
in the additional requirements. The cost of complying with these
additional requirements and evaluating them is probably not worth
the benefit gained by leaving them in the program. Contractors
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will be more willing to participate in CP(2) and other
certification programs if they adopt one standard for
certification of quality management programs and processes. ISO
9001 is the current recognized commercial standard.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusions of this study lead to several
recommendations for action to improve the Army's CP(2) program:
(1) continue to pursue and expand on source selection advantages
for certified contractors, (2) make performance to stringent
quality and on time delivery standards a requirement for full
certification, (3) track program participation and performance of
contractors inside and outside of the program to determine if the
program is having any positive effect, and (4) consider
eliminating all process and program assessment requirements that
are not part of ISO 9001.
1 . Source Selection Advantage
AMC should continue to pursue current efforts to give
certified contractors an advantage in the bid and proposal
process and expand on them where possible. Specifically, they
should include certification or its equivalent in the
solicitation as a significant evaluation factor for source
selection. If possible, they should make CP(2) certification or
its equivalent a requirement on long term contracts and other
contracts on which there is a significant risk to the Government
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associated with poor quality or late delivery. Also, they should
encourage contracting officers to limit the competitive range in
these source selections to certified offerors or those who can
provide documentation of similar programs and performance. Taken
together, these actions should help AMC to incentivize
contractors to improve their performance and participation in
CP(2). This, in turn, should improve the quality of AMC's
supplier base as well as the quality of incoming materiel.
2 . Performance Standards
AMC should consider requiring contractors to meet strict
standards of past performance on quality rate and on time
delivery in order to be fully certified. They should consult
with contractors in each industry area to determine appropriate
standards. As much as possible, AMC should use performance
metrics already in use by DCMC in order to avoid creating an
additional administrative burden. By requiring a high level of
past performance, AMC can further ensure that certified suppliers
will deliver high quality goods in a timely manner. Also, the
past performance standard will strengthen the effect of
certification in source selection, thereby making the argument
stronger for giving certified contractors an advantage.
Contractors without a record of past performance can still gain
the advantages of quality program and process certification.
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3.
Track Participation And Compare Performance
AMC should consider tracking the percentage of contractors
involved in CP(2) and the percentage of contracts in terms of
dollar value given to certified contractors. This will provide a
measure of potential affect of the program across AMC. They
should also compare the performance of certified and
non-certified contractors within the same industries to make sure
that the program is having a positive effect on the supplier
base. Based on these parameters AMC should be able to determine
if CP(2) is working as intended and whether they should make
changes or cancel the program.
4 . Remove Unique Requirements
AMC should consider removing the quality management
requirements above and beyond ISO 9001 from the program. This
would make CP(2) less costly to administer and make it more
attractive to contractors who already have mature quality
programs in place. Current acquisition reform programs, such as
the Single Process Initiative, encourage fewer military unique
requirements. AMC should seriously consider whether or not the
unique requirements of CP(2) provide a benefit that outweighs the
cost of evaluating these requirements and the advantage that AMC
would gain by going to a more universally accepted standard.
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C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1
.
What are the significant problems associated with the
Army's Contractor Performance Certification Program [CP(2)], and
what actions can be taken to overcome these problems and improve
the supplier certification program for the U.S. Army?
The significant problems in CP(2) were discussed in detail
in the Chapter IV. In brief, they are: lack of strong
incentives for contractors to participate in the program, lack of
objective performance requirements for certification, burdensome
additional requirements placed on contractors, and lack of
measurable benefits and costs from which the program can be
justified.
The actions that should be taken to overcome these problems
are found in the recommendations section.
2 . What limitations does CICA place on certification of
contractors and what can be done to overcome these limitations?
In the past, CICA requirements for full and open competition
have kept the Army from giving certified contractors the kind of
advantages in obtaining future contracts that commercial
businesses give their certified suppliers. Recently, acquisition
reform legislation, including FASA, relaxed some of these
requirements. The Army may now be able to use certification as a
requirement or as a significant source selection criteria in
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solicitations. This would overcome the limitations imposed by
CICA and possibly attract more contractors to CP(2).
3 . What limitations do current Army policies and culture
place on certification of contractors and how can they be
overcome?
The only limitations in Army policies are those that
implement CICA. These can be overcome as stated in the answer to
question 2 above. As discussed earlier, there does not seem to
be any significant cultural opposition in the Army procurement
community to contractor certification programs.
4 . What lessons can be learned from supplier certification
programs in other Government organizations and how can they be
implemented in the Army?
The Air Force and Navy systems both emphasized evaluation of
performance. This can be implemented by including evaluation of
past performance in the CP(2) program.
The Air Force canceled their Bue Ribbon Program because it
was not used enough to justify the cost. The Army can avoid this
by tracking the use of CP(2) and by making the evaluation system
as easy as possible for contracting officers to work with so that
they will not look at it as an added burden.
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5.
What are the key elements of successful supplier
certification programs in commercial companies and how can they
be implemented in the Army?
The key elements of commercial certified supplier programs
are the definite business advantages given to their certified
suppliers and the balance between process and performance
evaluations reguired for certification. The Army can give
certified suppliers an advantage and reguire performance
evaluations as discussed in recommendations.
6. What are the metrics that can be used to measure the
costs and benefits of a supplier certification program in the
Army in order to determine the cost effectiveness of the program?
Costs and benefits are hard to quantify but program
participation can be measured. See Recommendations, part 3.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1 . Contractor Incentives
More study should be given to how contractors can be given
incentives to perform well. Incentives can be offered, not only
through programs such as CP(2), but also through innovative





A deeper study of cost and benefit metrics would be useful
to determine the real worth of supplier certification programs.
Commercial programs would be a good place to start since they are
typically more focused on the bottom line than Government
agencies. They may have more objective, quantifiable data.
3 . Applicability Of Supplier Certification Across
Industries
Knowledge of the relative level of use of supplier
certification programs in various industries would help the Army
and other Government agencies determine where supplier
certification is most applicable. Again, industry sources could
provide good information for a complete study.
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